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Abstract: This paper uses the Understanding Children’s Work (UCW) definition of child labor and data 
from EPAM Mali to highlight the gender difference in the competition between children’s economic or 
non-economic labor and schooling. A Quadri-variate Probit estimation was first used to account for the 
interdependency between school and various kinds of child labor: household chores (HHC), market-
oriented (MO) activities and non-market-oriented (NMO) activities. Then, a Clogit estimation was used 
to examine the incidence of time repartition among children within the household regarding the 
probability  of  schooling.  Empirical  results  from  EPAM  Mali  provide  interesting  findings,  including 
differential gender socialization according to the gender of the offspring, gender bias in repartition of 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
According  to  the  Platform  for  Action  of  the  1995  Beijing  Women’s  Conference,  women's 
contributions to development are seriously underestimated, and thus their social recognition is limited.
2  
Women and girl-children contribute to development through a great deal of unremunerated work.  On 
the one hand, women and girl -children participate in the production of goods and services for the 
market and for household consumption, in agriculture, food production, and family enterprises. Though 
included in the United Nations System of National Accounts and ,  therefore,  in  the  international 
standards for labor statistics, this unremunerated work —particularly  that  relating  to  agriculture—is 
often undervalued and under-recorded. On the other hand, women also still perform the great majority 
of unremunerated domestic work and community work, such as caring for children and the elderly, 
preparing  meals,  protecting  the  environment,  and providing  voluntary  assistance  to  vulnerable  and 
disadvantaged individuals and groups. This work is often not measured in quantitative terms and is not 
valued  in  national  accounts;  it  can  thereby  be  prejudicial  for  the  women’s  and  girl-children’s 
development  and  participation  in the other  activities:  labor market  participation,  schooling,  and  so 
forth. This lack of recognition also occurs in the economic literature, in which very few studies look at 
unremunerated domestic or non-domestic work since, even now, this activity is still perceived as non-
economic.  Indeed, the  economic  representation  of  labor  is  dominated  by  the  market  (and  labor  is 
treated as employment) while the market sector rests, in turn, on non-remunerated activities provided 
in the household.
3 Since the advent of the “new economy of the family,”(Becker, 1981) the economists 
of  human  capital  have  posed  the  problem  of  the  interaction  between  activities  in  the  household. 
However, advances in the analysis or in the recognition of non-remunerated household work remain 
weak. Concerning the determinants of participation or the effect on the schooling of children, especially 
for girl-children, very few studies in the prolific literature about schooling and child labor have examined 
domestic work or household chores. 
This  paper  uses  the  Understanding  Children’s  Work  (UCW)  project’s  definition  of  labor  to 
analyze  how  a  household’s  decisions  about  child  labor  and  investment  in  children’s  education 
interrelate, using data from EPAM Mali. EPAM Mali highlighted the time allocation between leisure, 
schooling, and labor. The survey was particularly suited to highlight the complexity and diversity of 
activities undertaken by household members. 
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For the study, the co-choice between labor and schooling is considered in the framework of an 
altruistic model suggested by Basu and Van (1998), where the head decides on the partition of children’s 
time. The authors defined the luxury axiom, which represents the main idea of the altruistic models. 
According to this model, a household will not push children into the labor market if their income is 
sufficiently high.  
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides some findings about the link between child 
labor and schooling in developing countries; section 3 presents the EPAM surveys and describes the 
strength of this survey for the analysis and descriptive analyses of data. Assuming simultaneous decision 
making and interdependence among decisions, I use multivariate Probit models to estimate the co-
choice between school and labor activities (Section 4). Section 5 offers a Conditional Logit estimation of 
schooling participation. I find evidence that non-economic domestic activities interfere with schooling 
and are particularly constraining for girls’ schooling.    
2. CHILD LABOR AND SCHOOLING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: RELEVANT 
FINDINGS  
 
There is very well documented literature on the determinants of child labor and its implications 
for children’s development, as well as insightful surveys discussing the findings (Grootaert & Kanbur, 
1995; Basu & Tzannatos, 2003; Edmonds & Pavcnik, 2005). Thus this literature review focuses only on 
the link between child-labor and schooling.   
Education and compulsory schooling have historically been considered as major instruments for 
eradicating child labor. Various authors have noted that the mere availability of good schools can do a 
lot to divert children away from long hours in the workplace (see, for example, Basu, 1999). Hence 
governments can intervene to create a variety of incentives, such as more and better schools, giving 
school meals, and so forth. For instance, Ravallion and Wodon (1999) found that the Bangladesh Food-
for-Education program is a strong incentive for school attendance. They concluded that a stipend with a 
value considerably less than the mean child wage was enough to ensure nearly full school attendance 
among participants.  
Previous research on child labor has revealed a problem of “stark poverty” whereby the parents 
are obliged to send the children to work for reasons of survival (Basu & Van, 1998; Huebler, 2008 ). 
Children’s  leisure  or  non-work  (especially  education)  appears  as  a  luxury  good  in  the  household’s 
consumption in the sense that a poor household cannot afford to consume this good, but it does so as 
the household income rises sufficiently. Basu and Van (1998)  spoke of the “luxury axiom,” and Bhalotra 
and Heady (2003) revealed a “wealth paradox” to describe the paradoxical observation of a higher 
incidence of child labor in households that are rich in land and other agricultural assets. They noted that 
in  Ghana  and  Pakistan,  the  daughters  of  land-rich  households  are  more  likely  to  work  than  the 5 
 
daughters of land-poor households. In Pakistan, girls’ school attendance also decreases according to the 
ownership  of  more  acreage  of  farm  land.  The  finding  that  a  larger  farm  size  increases  child  labor 
suggests that, at given levels of household income, the return to work relative to the return to school is 
a significant determinant of child labor, especially among girls.
4  
Some authors have stressed that child labor and schooling are substitutes  for one another and 
that child labor competes with education, especially in poor families. For instance, Ravallion and Wodon 
(1999) demonstrated how much child labor displaces schooling, and Jensen and Nielsen (1997)assumed 
that schooling is the reverse of labor. Psacharopoulos  (1997) in Bolivia and Venezuela showed that 
through working, children contribute to household incomes  and that the educational attainment of 
children who work is significantly lower than that of nonworking children.  Researchers have generally 
concluded that  the low current incomes of their families keep poor children out of school and 
perpetuate the poverty into the next generation (Baland & Robinson, 1998).  
Other studies have stressed that education and schooling are not mutually exclus ive, but have 
shown that such activities are complementary in the acquisition of survival skills. According to Patrinos 
and Psacharopoulos (1997), child labor is not detrimental to schooling in Za mbia; rather child labor 
makes it possible for children to go to school. Kruger and Berthelon (2003) found that additional income 
generated by boys’ employment in Nicaragua facilitates their schooling. The importance and possibility 
of combining school and labor is also found in Grootaert’s (1998) study of Côte d’Ivoire. Heady (2000) 
found a positive relationship between schooling and participation in activities (housework, family farm, 
and family enterprise) for boys in Ghana. In this study, boys who worked a small amount of time (less 
than 10 hours per week) on the family farm or other family enterprise were more likely to attend school 
than those who did not work at all. This result means that expected household income increased the 
boys’ chance of attending school. However, for the same country, Heady noted a positive relationship 
between school and girls’ work on the household farm, but a negative relationship between school and 
girls’ work on household enterprises. Cockburn (2001) and Maitra and Ray (2002) also made explicit 
observations that children tend to combine school and labor. These results do not detract from the fact 
that compulsory education can play a role in limiting child labor. 
Whatever the link between education and child-labor (whether mutually exclusive or not, for 
example) child work can be harmful to the development of human capital because it decreases the time 
spent on study, the probability  of attendance at school, the child’s performance at school, and  an 
increase in the likelihood that children would drop out of school. The fact that a child is obliged to work 
has a detrimental effect on the accumulation of human capital and, of course, on the subsequent private 
and social returns from it (Psacharopoulos, 1997).  
The impact of economic activity on children’s school performance has been widely studied. 
Rosati and Rossi (2001) in Pakistan and Nicaragua, Gunnarsson and al. (2006) in eleven Latin American 
                                                           
4 Such a large effect suggests that efforts to combat child labor may have substantial payoffs in the form of increased future 
earnings once children become adults. 6 
 
countries,  Patrinos  and  Psacharopoulos  (1999)  in  Paraguay,  Heady  (2003)  in  Ghana,  Patrinos  and 
Psacharopoulos (1997) in Peru, and Akabayashi and Psacharopoulos (1999) in Tanzania all showed that 
child  labor  significantly  reduces  school  performance.  Psacharopoulos  (1997)  noted,  in  Bolivia  and 
Venezuela, that child work increases the probability of a failing grade and reduces their educational 
attainment by one to two years. According to Ray and Lancaster (2005), the negative impact of child 
labor on school outcomes is more detrimental for girls than for boys. 
One aspect of the analysis of education and schooling that has received a lot of attention in 
recent  years  is  the  trade-off  for  parents  in  making  decisions  between  child  labor  and  schooling. 
Education and labor are seen as co-choices, and the two activities are seen as either sequential or 
simultaneous.
5  Authors who fit into the framework of co -choice analysis generally use d  bivariate 
estimation models to examine the interdependence of the joint labo r and schooling decision.
6 Authors 
have also discussed trade-off between activities when factors that tend to increase children’s working 
activities or hours of labor generally tend to decrease their probability of schooling participation or 
school outcomes (Akabayashi & Psacharopoulos, 1999; Muniz, 2001; Ganglmair, 2006).  
Very few studies have been interested in the trade-off that parents face regarding the decision 
between domestic activities and schooling.
7 The main determinants of children’s domestic activities are 
age and rank between siblings, gender, and parents’ work hours.
8 Studies have generally revealed a 
gender specialization. For instance, Kruger and Berthelon  (2007) noted that if pure market work is 
analyzed, girls are more likely to attend school and less likely to work than boys; but if work includes 
household chores, girls are more likely to work and less likely to be in school than boys. Edmonds (2006) 
finds that the oldest girls in a family work 4.2 and 9.8 more times than the second oldest girl in families 
with four and six children, respectively.  Haile and Haile (2007), in studying Ethiopia, showed a gender 
specialization for co-choice between school and labor:  boys are more likely to combine school with 
market-oriented activities, and girls are more likely to combine school and domestic chores. Kruger and 
Berthelon (2003) found that in Nicaragua, the presence of pre-school children in the household reduced 
the probability that girls would attend school, but had no effect for boys. These results show that the 
type of activity is an important determinant of children’s education and labor. In reality, child labor is 
seen as an important factor of socialization for the future. Khan (2003) concluded that parents assign 
household work activities due to social norms, and girls have a higher probability of participating in 
homemaking, compared to boys.  
                                                           
5 Depending on the welfare situation of the household, parents decide on the school participation (labor activity) and then send 
the child to work (to school).   
6 Canagarajah and Coulombe(1997), Nielsen (1998), Muniz (2001) Emerson and Souza (2007), Ganglmair (2006). 
7 Data on housework are difficult to collect. Information may be collected using time -use surveys. The Living Standard Survey 
Measurement (LSMS) and Enquêtes permanentes auprès des ménages (EPAM) provide detailed information about the time 
used for household activities. Several studies have shown that housework activities tend to be over-reported in questionnaires, 
suggesting that time spent on these activities is more precisely measured through time-use surveys or time diaries (Guarcello, 
Lyon, Rosati, & Valdivia, 2007).  
8 For a non-exhaustive list: McHale et al., 1990; Benin and Edwards, 1990; Hilton and Halderman, 1991; Blair, 1992; Antill and 
al., 1996; Demo and Acock, 1993; Ilahi, 2001. Blair (1992) noted that the participation of girls in housework increases with the 
mother’s hours of employment.  7 
 
The previous definition of child labor seems debatable, in which “labor” generally refers to 
market-oriented activities or paid work. It is clear that the allocation of tasks is strongly influenced by 
gender, and various activities differently affect the participation of girls and boys at school. If child labor 
concerns only paid work, girls who are withdrawn from school in order to contribute to domestic activity 
will be considered as "doing nothing," which can strongly bias and underestimate the real consequences 
of child labor, especially for girls. Scientific studies, especially those based in Latin American countries, 
have provided evidence of the importance of household chores in the trade-off between labor and 
schooling. Kruger and Berthelon (2007) noted that if domestic activities are considered, girls are more 
likely than boys to drop out from school and to dedicate their time exclusively to work; they are also less 
likely to specialize in school activities. They noted that this effect increases with the amount of time 
devoted to chores. Levison and Moe (1998) found that better socioeconomic variables reduce both the 
probability  that  girls  will  perform  household  chores  and  the  number  of  hours  spent  on  household 
chores, and increase the number of hours spent on school. In Mexico Levison et al. (2001) found that if 
only market work is considered, girls are more likely to specialize in schooling relative to boys, but that 
once household domestic work is included in the definition of work, girls are more likely to specialize in 
work than are boys. Contreras et al. (2007) estimated bivariate probit regressions on the determinants 
of market work and school enrollment. The authors found that in Bolivia, market and total work are 
significant deterrents to school enrollment for all children, and that young boys and girls aged 7 to 14 
years are equally likely to be enrolled in school and to be working in the market; but once domestic 
activities were included in the concept of work, children are just as likely to attend school, but girls are 
more likely than boys to be working. 
This  paper  uses  the  UCW  definition  of  child  labor  to  highlight  the  competition  between 
schooling and various kinds of child labor in Mali. It uses a multivariate estimation to account for the 
interdependence between school and MO activities, NMO activities, and household chores. In addition 
to analyzing the co-choice between schooling and labor, the paper investigates the incidence of time 
repartition on schooling decisions. The aim is to show a gender bias in parents’ decisions.   
3. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS  
EPAM Mali  (Enquêtes  Permanente Emploi  auprès  des Ménages,  2007)  is  part  of  a series of 
surveys,  undertaken  since  2000,  on  the  economic  activities  of  households.  These  surveys  highlight 
behaviors in the labor market, along with formal and informal activities, and give detailed information 
on labor market participation, unemployment, and labor market income. EPAM 2007 is based on 17,439 
individuals  and  3,006  households,  and  it  provides  detailed  information  about  labor  activities, 
unemployment, job search, the trajectory and perspective of employment, and so forth. The survey is 8 
 
particularly interesting because it records, for each household member aged 10 years or more, the 
participation and time used in household activities over seven days.
9   
A wide variety of terms, statistical definitions and measures are employed in the child labor 
literature.  The  definition  of  child  labor  generally  depends  on  how  we  define  “work”  or  “labor” 
(economic or non-economic activities, market or non-market activities, hours, conditions of child work, 
and so forth); how we define “child“ (age); and the quality of statistics available. The International Labor 
Organization’s (ILO) Convention has specified 15 years as the age above which, in normal circumstances, 
a person may participate in economic activity.
10 Huebler(2008) considered children between 7 and 14 
years old to be child laborers, and child labor was defined for all ages as at least one hour of economic 
activity or 28 hours or more per week in household chores. Emerson and Souza (2007) and Sakellariou 
and Lall  (2000)  categorized  child labor as working a positive number of hour s;  and for a separate 
analysis, they used a more restrictive indicator and looked at children that worked more than 20 hours 
per week. A child is generally  classified as a worke r if he is “economically active” (Ashagrie, 1993; 
Ganglmair, 2006) or if he provides work on a regular basis for which he is remunerated or that results in 
output destined to the labor market. Muniz (2001) defined waged workers, non-waged workers and 
domestic workers. The principal difficulty for the analysis of child labor in developing countries is that 
children  work  in  a  variety  of  settings,  not  only  as  wage  workers  but  also  as  domestic  or  informal 
workers. Concerning the definition of domestic activities, more studies that deal with household non-
economic  activities  refer  to  housework,  but  rarely  define  such  concepts  explicitly.  The  core  of  the 
definitions common to all studies includes housework activities (cleaning, cooking, and so forth). Ilahie 
(2001) included care of children, the sick, and the elderly; Blair (1992) added maintenance tasks. The 
definitions  and  corresponding  information  can  provide  very  different  answers  depending  on  which 
source we turn to (see for discussion Grootaert  and Kanbur, 1995).
11 According to Huebler(2008) the 
inclusion of household chores in statistics of child labor creates a more accurate measure of the burden 
of work carried by girls and boys.  
Current research by the UCW project, conducted by ILO, UNICEF, and the World Bank, provides 
a more accurate measure of child labor (Guarcello & al., 2007). The UN international trial classification 
system is used to identify which activities are economic, falling into the System of National Accounts 
(SNA) production boundary, and which do not (Appendix 1). I adopted this latter classification, even if 
the definition of  household chores (HHC) as “non-economic” activities seems debatable. Thus in this 
paper labor is defined as follows:  
  SNA productive and economic activities, which includes market-oriented (MO) and non-market-
oriented (NMO) activities. MO activities are those leading to the production of goods and services 
                                                           
9 EPAM Mali is particularly interesting since children in developing countries work in a variety of settings, not only in market- 
oriented activities, but also in various domestic work, informal work, and so forth. 
10 The convention specifies some special cases such as “light work” for an age limit of thirteen and “hazardous work” for an age 
limit of eighteen (ILO, 1996). 
11 Blair(1992) did not include childcare  in his household labor study because this information was not available due to the 
limitation of data. 9 
 
that are intended for sale or are sold on the market. NMO activities involve goods produced by the 
members of the household for their own final consumption, including own-account production of 
goods and own-account construction and substantial repair services by owners of dwellings. Water 
and  wood  collection  are  included  in  NMO  activities.  The  production  of  domestic  and  personal 
services for consumption within the same household, such as the preparation of meals, care of 
children, housekeeping, and so forth, are included within the SNA boundary only if produced by 
employed paid domestic staff. 
  Household chores (HHC) like housekeeping, meal preparation, child care and elderly, and so forth.  
 
The definition of child labor is foundational for the collection of data. The lack of information 
related to children’s housework and their time spent on housework is a considerable problem. In EPAM 
Mali, a concerted effort has been made for time data collection, especially to collect information that 
allows for a distinction between HHC, which enter into NMO activities, and the other housework. The 
individual questionnaire contained a set of questions related to the activities carried out during the last 
seven days. For the schooling decision the question asked was “Are you currently attending school?” For 
the work decision, the question for household members older than 10 years was “During the last seven 
days have you done one or more of the following activities: 1) housekeeping, 2) preparation of meal, 3) 
collection of wood, 4) collection of water, 5) child care, 6) elder care, 7) repairs and maintenance, 8) 
social activities with family, 9) associative activities.” Information on working hours was collected as the 
number of hours worked during the last seven days for each activity. The child was considered to be in 
school if he or she is currently attending school. 
Table 1 reports the participation rates of children (between 10 and 18 years old) in school, in 
SNA activities, and in household chores (HHC). The choice of this categorization for age is debatable 
when child labor is prohibited for children under 15 years old and for those more than 14 years old; it is 
probable  that  most  of  the  children  are  exclusively  on  the  job  market.  But  this  choice  also  gives 
information about the education of children beyond primary school, while some of them are drop out. 
Moreover, younger children’s housework is less typed by gender. The repartition of time and tasks 
among children is more segregated by gender as children become teenagers (Benin & Edwards, 1990; 
McHale & al., 1990; Hilton & Halderman, 1991; Demo & Acock, 1993; Antill & al., 1996).  I intended to 
make a comparison between boys and girls to check for gender bias. So I defined for a mean comparison 
test  ∆ρ  =  mean  (boys)  –  mean  (girls),  and  I  tested  against  the  null  hypothesis:
0   =   (girls) mean    -   (boys) mean     :   H0 .   
According to descriptive statistics, more than 51% of children are currently  attending school. 
The proportion of boys enrolled at school is higher than  the proportion of girls (62% vs. 41%), and the 
mean comparison test confirms this result. Less than one child out of four devotes himself exclusively to 
school, and this proportion is higher for boys (30%) than for girls (12%). Concerning labor participation, 
children are more engaged in SNA activities (64%) than in HHC (52%). The statistics suggest that boys are 
more SNA-oriented, and girls are more HHC-oriented, since 57% of boys  are engaged in SNA activities 10 
 
(vs.  29%  of  boys  engaged  in  HHC)  and  77%  of  girls  are  doing  HHC  (vs.  71%  of  girls  engaged  SNA 
activities). These proportions vary widely when looking at the kind of activities. Boys are more engaged 
in MO activities compared to each NMO activity. The proportion of boys engaged in HHC is small; except 
for the proportion of 20% for housekeeping and 10% for social activities with family, the participation 
rate of boys does not exceed 5% in activities registered as HHC. Girls, as one might expect it, are more 
engaged in housekeeping (71%), collection of water (approximately 59%), meal preparation (56%), MO 
activities (39%), cutting and gathering of woods (27%),  and child care (23%). The girls, on average, 
devote twice as much time to HHC as the boys; Table 1 suggests that girls devote 22 hours per week to 
HHC, while boys devote 11 hours per week.  The mean comparison test suggests that the idea that girls’ 
time spent in HHC is higher than boys’ is a hypothesis one cannot reject. On the other hand, the mean 
comparison  tests  suggests  that  the  hypothesis  that  time  spent  by  girls  and  boys  in  NMO  and  MO 
activities are identical cannot be rejected, at the mean.   
The gender comparison of SNA productive and economic activities suggests that the hypothesis 
that participation of girls is higher than participation of boys cannot be rejected, except for repairs and 
maintenance, where 19% of boys engaged in this activity vs. 5% of girls. Girls are more engaged in 
market-oriented activities (39% vs. 34%), in cutting and gathering wood (27% vs. 24%), and in water 
collection (59% vs. 27%) than boys. As expected, the hypothesis that girls are more engaged in each HHC 
than  boys  cannot  be  rejected,  and  the  most  important  difference  is  observed  for  participation  in 
housekeeping. I performed a chi-square test to check the assumption of independence between the 
participation  in  the  four  activities  (school,  HHC,  MO,  and  NMO)  and  the  sex  of  the  children.  This 
assumption is rejected at 1%. That means that the reason why a child does HHC is not independent of 
his gender.    
Table 1 also reveals that there  is a non-negligible number of children, especially girls, who 
perform HHC exclusively. According to the statistics, 42% of girls perform HHC exclusively whereas only 
11% of boys make HHC exclusively; and the hypothesis that girls’ participation is higher than boys one 
cannot be rejected.  The reverse is true for SNA activities exclusively. Statistics suggest that 46% of boys 
are exclusively engaged in SNA activity and 28.5% of girls exclusively are engaged SNA activities. These 
results are consistent with studies showing that it is not uncommon for girls to be used as workers in 
household and boys employed outside the home. 
I performed an analysis to consider the repartition of time between children according to their 
age and sex.  Though the difference is quite clear for HHC, where the time devoted to this activity is 
higher at each age for girls than for boys, and although time increases with age for the girls, whereas 
time devoted to HHC decreases with age for boys, particularly after 15, the conclusions are less obvious 
for time in NMO and MO activities. For MO, the time devoted by boys is slightly higher than the time 
devoted by girls. Between 15 and 16 years of age and after age 17, the graph suggests that girls devote 
more time than boys to this activity. For NMO activities, the graph suggests that before 13 years of age, 
and between ages 14 and 16, the time spent is higher for boys than for girls.  The difference observed 
between genders in the repartition of time, especially in HHC, is consistent with the assumption that 
parents  assign  chores  to  children  as  a  socializing  experience  (Blair, 1992).  Indeed,  the  socialization 11 
 
literature emphasizes the commitment of the parents to the growth and development of their children. 
Children  have  moved  from  being  “economically  useful”  to  “emotionally  priceless,”  and  housework 
performed by children thus becomes more an educational tool for parents (Blair, 1992).  
Table 1. Participation rates of children between 10 and 18 years old in Mali sample 








H0 : mean(boys) – mean(girls) = 0  
        Ha2::mean(b) 
– mean(g)  ≠ 0 
Conclusion  






t =  11.5008 
pr = 0.000 
We  cannot  reject  the  hypothesis  that  girls'  (boys) 
participation is lower (higher) than boys' (girls'). 






t =  12.5234 
pr = 0.000 
We  cannot  reject  the  hypothesis  that  girls'  (boys) 
participation is lower (higher) than boys' (girls'). 
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t =  -8.3446 
pr= 0.000 
We cannot reject the hypothesis that girls' (boys) 
participation is higher (lower) than boys' (girls'). 






t =  -2.5966 
pr = 0.0095 
We cannot reject the hypothesis that girls' (boys) 
participation is higher (lower) than boys' (girls'). 






t =  -0.9718 
pr = 0.3314 









t =  -9.9583 
pr = 0.000 
We cannot reject the hypothesis that girls' (boys) 
participation is higher (lower) than boys' (girls'). 






t =  -1.8009 
pr = 0.0718 
We cannot reject the hypothesis that girls' (boys) 
participation is higher (lower) than boys' (girls'). 






t =  -18.4936 
pr= 0.000 
We cannot reject the hypothesis that girls' (boys) 
participation is higher (lower) than boys' (girls'). 






t =   12.1082 
pr = 0.000 
We  cannot  reject  the  hypothesis  that  girls'  (boys) 
participation is lower (higher) than boys' (girls'). 






t =  0.9863 
pr = 0.3241 









t =  5.9731 
pr = 0.000 
We  cannot  reject  the  hypothesis  that  girls'  (boys) 











t =  -29.621 
pr = 0.000 
We cannot reject the hypothesis that girls' (boys) 
participation is higher (lower) than boys' (girls'). 






t =  -32.3564 
pr = 0.0000 
We cannot reject the hypothesis that girls' (boys) 
participation is higher (lower) than boys' (girls'). 






t =  -31.0617 
pr= 0.000 
We cannot reject the hypothesis that girls' (boys) 
participation is higher (lower) than boys' (girls'). 






t =   -
15.6188 
pr = 0.000 
We cannot reject the hypothesis that girls' (boys) 
participation is higher (lower) than boys' (girls'). 






t =  -4.7537  
pr = 0.000 
We cannot reject the hypothesis that girls' (boys) 
participation is higher (lower) than boys' (girls'). 






t =   -4.9326 
pr = 0.000 
We cannot reject the hypothesis that girls' (boys) 
participation is higher (lower) than boys' (girls'). 






t =  -1.6678 
pr= 0.0955 
We cannot reject the hypothesis that girls' (boys) 
participation is higher (lower) than boys' (girls'). 






t =  -10.8197 
pr= 0.000 
We cannot reject the hypothesis that girls' (boys) 
participation is higher (lower) than boys' (girls'). 






t =  -11.5794 
pr= 0.000 
We cannot reject the hypothesis that girls' (boys) 
participation is higher (lower) than boys' (girls'). 
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 Research on housework allocation demonstrated that entry into marriage and parenthood induces 
women  and  men  to  perform 
different  kinds  or  amounts  of 
housework (Cunningham, 2001). 
Given  that  the  acquisition  of 
knowledge in what is generally 
assigned to each sex depends on 
the activity of the adult with the 
child, parents reinforce gender 
stereotypes:  girls are prepared 
to stay at home and learn to do 
future  female  activities,  while 
boys are less engaged in HHC.    
Indeed, girls are more engaged 
in HHC than in NMO and MO 
activities,  whereas  boys  are 
more engaged in NMO, MO, and 
HHC. Almost half of the boys in 
the sample engage in exclusively 
productive  and  economic 
activities, while the proportion is 
two  times  lower  f or  girls. 
Conversely, almost  half of the 
girls in the sample do exclusively 
“non-economic”  but  productive 
activities, while the proportion is 
four  times  lower  for  boys. 
Finally,  time  devoted  to  “non-
economic”  but  productive 
activities increases with age for 
girls, while it decreases with age 
for boys. 
These  findings  reveal  the 
difficulties of banning child labor 
(including  HHC);  going  beyond 
resource  needs  of  the  family, 
child  labor  represents  an 
important factor of socialization.   13 
 
4. QUADRI-VARIATE PROBIT ESTIMATION FOR INTERDEPENDENCE AMONG 
SCHOOL AND LABOR ACTIVITIES 
Ray  and  Lancaster  (2005)  chose  to  analyze  the  determinant  of  children’s  participation  in 
schooling  and  employment  with  a  multinomial  Logit  estimation,  because  this  procedure  extends 
bivariate estimation by allowing for more than two possibilities in the outcomes variable. However, 
Capelleri and Jenkins (2006)provided a multivariate Probit program, which allows for more than two 
possibilities and assumes simultaneous decision making and interdependence among activities. I used 
this program and considered a Quadri-variate Probit model for co-choice between schooling and HHC, 
NMO, and MO activities.   
a. QUADRI-VARIATE PROBIT MODEL  
Assuming simultaneous decision making and interdependence among child labor activities and 
child schooling, estimating a joint decisions model seems to be the best empirical strategy.
12 Quadri-
variate models allow for jointly estimating a household’s co-choice between education and HHC, MO, 
and  NMO  activities.  To  assess  whether  labor  activities  affect  school  participation,  I  estimated  the 
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X is a vector of exogenous variables and βk (k=1,k) is a vector of associated parameters;
 
 
εi1, εim (m= HHC, MO, NMO) are error terms distributed as a multivariate normal with mean zero and 
covariance V. The matrix V has unit diagonal elements, and off-diagonal elements are defined by ρjk = ρkj.  
I performed an analysis for all children, boys and girls separately. The estimations were carried out using 
Stata’s mvprobit module of Capellari and Jenkins (2006).  The mvprobit command applies the method of 
SML evaluated and uses the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) smooth recursive conditioning simulator 
to evaluate the multivariate normal distribution.  Capellari and Jenkins (2006) state that the simulated 
                                                           
12 For example, children with higher ability can have a higher probability of going to school and a lower probability of working, 
which results in a negative correlation between the errors. 14 
 
probabilities  are  unbiased,  and  they  bound  the  correlation  coefficient  ρjk  within  the  (0,1)  interval.  
  
The quadric Probit estimation takes into account the likely correlation between the errors’ terms. The 
estimation  of  a  recursive  multivariate  probit  model  requires  some  consideration  for  the 
identification of the model’s parameters. Maddala (1983, p. 122) states, for the two equation probit 
model, that the parameters of the second equation are not identified if there are no exclusion 
restrictions on the exogenous variables. Wilde (2000) demonstrates that no additional restrictions on 
the  parameters  are  needed  to  achieve  the  identification  of  the  multivariate  probit  model  with  an 
endogenous  dummy  regressor.  Identification  requires  only  the  existence  of  one  varying  exogenous 
regressor.  
 
Various tests were considered for this analysis:  
a.  The first test is to verify whether the decomposition of activities is justified. The decomposition 
is justified if the determinants of labor participation differ according to labor activities. The test consists 
in checking the null hypothesis j k H j k   ; : 1   .   
b.  Referring to Akabayashi and Psacharopoulos (1999), Muniz (2001), or Ganglmair (2006), the 
second test is the following trade-off k sign sign H    1 2 : . That is, the respective coefficients in the 
labor activities and school equations with the same explanatory are of opposite signs. If H2 is rejected 
and the sign of the effect of the variable on labor participation is opposite to that of participation at 
school, then this exogenous factor increases (decreases) the probability of participation in child labor 
and decreases (increases) the probability of participating in schooling. 
c.  The correlation coefficient jk   is defined as an unobserved trade-off or intrinsic competition between 
activities (labor and schooling). The fourth test consists of checking the null hypothesis of trade-off to be 
zero,  NMO MO HHC k Sk , , ; 0   :   H3    .    This  test  also  allows  us  to  check  the  null  hypothesis  of 
independence between decisions. The significance mean that the non-explained component (residual) 
related to the fact of the child’s attendance (or not) at school is linked to the non-explained component 
of the working decision.  Nielsen (1998) interprets the correlation coefficient ρ as the extent to which 
school attendance decreases (increases) as a result of an increase (decrease) in the labor due to an 
unobserved  factor.  Ganglmair  (2006)  says  that  the  correlation  coefficient  represents  the  degree  to 
which the parents decide in favor of labor against school and vice versa. 
d.  The third test consists of checking the gender differences between the determinants of child labor and 
schooling; a gender difference in competition between co-choices:  b g H    : 4 .    
If the hypothesis is rejected, that means that repartition of time between children is gendered.  
 
The paper is based on children between 10  and 18 years old. The variables that can affect the co -
choice between school and labor are as follows:  
  Characteristics of children: age, sex (girl = 1), children of the household head 15 
 
  Characteristics of household: status (polygamous = 1), residence (urban = 1), number of head’s 
children, proportion of girls among the children of the head. 
  Head characteristics: gender (female =1), education, labor income (principal and secondary 
activities).
13 
  I also introduced an exogenous variable for the presence of an employed paid domestic in 
the HHC equation; an exogenous variable for the household head’s profession (farmer =1) in 
the MO equation; and an exogenous variable for the number of females (other than child 
and spouses of the household head and household head itself) more than 12 years old in the 
NMO equation.  
b. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
Tables 2 and 5 report the Quadri-variate Probit results for child labor and school participation. Basic 
results reveal that boys have a higher probability than girls to go to school.    
The proportion of girls among the household head children also increases the probability of a boy’s 
schooling. Although the results do not allow not rejecting gender bias in participation in MO activities, 
girls have a higher probability than boys to do NMO activities or HHC. The children in urban areas have a 
higher probability of going to school than children in rural areas and a lower probability of working.  This 
result is confirmed for each kind of labor activity (MO, NMO, and HHC), except for HHC for boys.
14 
Similarly, children of the household head have a higher probability than the others to go to school, and a 
lower probability to engage in labor.  The results suggest that having a female household head increases 
the probability of school participation, but also increases the probability  of MO activities, especially for 
boys. This result probably reflects the fact that household s  headed by female s  are poorer.  The 
component  that the  female household head generally captures  is  gender vulnerability to poverty.   
According to Ray  (2000),  female-headed households are more vulnerable to poverty and are  more 
dependent on children’s earnings and child labor than are male-headed households. Ray and Lancaster 
(2005) also noted that children in female-headed households and in households with low levels of adult 
education  tend  to  perform  worse  than  other  children.  Psacharopoulos  (1997)  also  found  that  the 
probability of a working child is higher in female-headed households in Bolivia. On the other hand, 
Canagarajah  and Coulombe (1997) found that children from female-headed households have a higher 
probability of going to school in Ghana. Maitra and Ray  (2000) found in Pakistan that the gender of the 
head of household does not matter in the schooling decision of children.    
                                                           
13 Originally conducted to provide information about labor activity in Mali, EPAM does not provide any information about 
assets, property, household expenses, or other information to measure household wealth. Collecting data on the household 
head’s labor income was the only way to provide information about the wealth of the household; and I know that this measure 
is very debatable. Taking into account the fact that the objective of this paper is to compare competition between various labor 
activities and schooling, I do not think that this form of household wealth can have a great influence on the coefficient of 
correlation. Thus the survey provides qualitative variables in the form of income classified into nine intervals, from none up to 
SMIC at above 500,000 a month. In the form that it is used, household head income represents a categorical (ordinal) variable 
from 0 at 9. Note that education variables can capture a substantial part of the income effect due to the correlation between 
the two variables. 
14 This result is probably due to the lower participation of boys, or to the fact that difference in participation between areas  is 
not significant for boys in HHC. 16 
 
For Brazil, Muniz  (2001) found instead that female household heads in Brazil are less likely to send their 
children to school and more likely to send them to waged work. Khan (2003) found in Pakistan that 
children  from  male-headed  households  have  a  lower  probability  of  going  to  school  and  a  higher 
probability of working. He concluded that despite the lower socioeconomic status of female heads, they 
are good household managers regarding children’s education. Huebler  (2008) found that children with a 
female  head  of  household  have  a  higher  probability  of  being  in  school  but  a  lower  probability  of 
working.  
The results also suggest that the household head is adverse (disutility) to his own daughters’ 
labor, although only the girls of the household head have a decreased probability of working in MO, 
NMO  or  HHC.  The  level  of  education  of  the  household  head  is  also  an  increasing  component  of 
participation  at  school,  except  for  girls,  where  results  suggest  that  education  of  the  head  has  a 
significant  and  positive  impact  on  school  participation  when  the  household  head  has  at  least  a 
secondary education. 
Results  suggest  for  education  that  the  schooling  of  girls  (but  not  boys)  increases  with  an 
additional secondary income of the household head. This latter result confirms the hypothesis that girls’ 
schooling is more constrained by the household wealth than the education of boys (Appleton, 1995; 
Lavy, 1996; Glick & Sahn, 2000).  The “luxury axiom” suggests that there is a critical wage such that the 
household will push its children to work if, and only if, the adult wages prevailing in the market are less 
than the critical wage. This implies that household wealth is a decreasing component of children labor. 
The effects of the household head incomes in the estimations go against the “luxury axiom”; labor 
participation of boys increases, in all the activities, with secondary income for the head, and the MO 
activity of girls increases with the head’s labor income. Bhalotra and Heady (2003) used the term wealth 
paradox  to  describe  the  initially  paradoxical  observation  of  a  higher  incidence  of  child  labor  in 
households  that  are  rich  in  land  and  other  agricultural  assets,  shedding  new  light  on  the  poverty 
explanation. Note also that the choice of the labor income, like the household wealth indicator, is 
debatable. Finally, results suggest that the presence of the domestic in a household and the number of 
females  of  more  than  12  years  old  are  components  that  decrease  HHC  and  NMO  participation, 
respectively. The farmer household head is an increasing component of the MO participation.  
Concerning  the  first  hypothesis  about  differences  in  determinants  of  labor  activities’ 
participation, the results confirm the adopted classification (definition) of child labor since determinants 
of child labor are not the same according to the kind of tasks provides by children. For each sample, I 
used a Wald test on key variables (urban, for example) and for all the explanatory variables. Indeed the 
results of the Wald tests in Table 3 suggest that the null hypothesis (H1) of equality of coefficient is 
rejected for all pairs. The tests confirm that determinants of labor are different according to the kind of 
activities. Table 2 suggests that the effect of age is not the same according to the labor equation. When 
looking at the estimation for all the samples, the effect of age is non-significant for HHC for children, 
while the participation in MO decreases, then increases, and then decreases again with age; and the 
participation in NMO increases with the age of the children. Concerning the component “sex” (girl=1), 
the results suggest a significance in all the estimations of labor participation, except for MO activities. 17 
 
The results also suggest that the number of the head’s children is a decreasing component for HHC and 
MO  participation,  while  this  component  is  non-significant  for  NMO.  The  status  of  the  household 
(polygamous =1) is an increasing component for MO activities only.   
Table 2. Quadri-variate Probit for co-choice between HHC, MO, and NMO and schooling  
Variables   HHC  MO  NMO   Schc 
  Coef  Z  Coef  Z  Coef  Z  Coef  Z 
Age  0,889  0.88  -2,940  -2.63
$  0,033  3.38
$  2,425  2.15** 
Age
2/100  -6,236  -0.85  22,302  2.74
$      -18,113  -2.21** 
Age
3/1000  156,180  0.89  -529,892  -2.74
$      420,838  2.15** 
Girl  1,254  23.34
$  0,051  0.97  0,533  10.25
$  -0,519  -9.80
$ 
Child of HH head  -0,303  -4.53
$  -0,123  -1.85*  -0,120  -1.79*  0,623  9.20
$ 
Number of head children  -0,026  -2.65
$  -0,034  -3.43
$  -0,004  -0.44  0,006  0.60 
Proportion of girls  0,045  0.49  -0,076  -0.86  -0,077  -0.89  0,371  4.02
$ 
Urban   -0,209  -3.46
$  -0,692  -10.33
$  -0,683  -11.94
$  0,828  13.65
$ 
Female HH head  -0,107  -1.12  0,225  2.39**  -0,044  -0.47  0,292  3.01
$ 
Polygamous HH  0,018  0.30  0,138  2.38**  0,020  0.34  -0,051  -0.89 
Head primary education  0,215  2.04**  0,217  2.18**  0,096  0.98  0,293  2.80
$ 
Head secondary education  -0,162  -2.44**  -0,055  -0.77  -0,345  -5.35
$  0,523  7.58
$ 
Head higher education  -0,386  -2.88
$  0,128  0.91  -1,023  -6.42
$  0,520  3.85
$ 
Head income, principal labor  0,002  0.18  0,015  1.09  0,004  0.34  0,006  0.47 
Head income, secondary  labor  0,033  1.37  0,062  2.63
$  0,015  0.66  0,050  2.10** 
Head farmer      0,409  7.12
$         
Number of females (> 12 years old)          -0,045  -1.88*     
Domestic in the HH  -0,474  -3.02
$              
Constant   -4,595  -1.01  11,768  2.34**  -0,114  -0.70  -10,805  -2.14** 
RhoMO_HHC  0,319  9.71
$             
RhoNMO_HHC  0,709  34.47
$             
RhoS_HHC  -0,304  -9.60
$             
RhoNMO_MO  0,309  10.23
$             
RhoS_MO  -0,535  -20.51
$             
RhoS_NMO  -0,206  -6.64
$             
Obs.  3007 
Log pseudolikelihood  χ²=  -6268.0745  Pr =     0.0000                 
Wald chi2  1961.73 
Likelihood ratio test of  rho21 = rho31 = rho41 = rho32 = rho42 = rho43 = 0:  χ²=  1069.5 Pr = 0.0000 
Multivariate probit (SML, # draws = 55)   
Note: $ significant at 1%level, ** significant at 5%level, * significant at 10% level 
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The breakdown of activities according to UCW reveals that it is more interesting and more informative 
to consider MO activities, NMO activities, and HHC separately.   
 
Table 3. Wald test of comparison of coefficient among child labor activities 
    Children   Boys   Girls  
Test [HHC=MO=NMO] girl   Χ²  354.82     
pvalue  0.000     
Test [HHC=MO=NMO] urban  Χ²  72.06  45.86  33.01 
pvalue  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Test [HHC=MO=NMO]  for all 
explanatory  variables  
Χ²  583.23  129.65  191.67 
pvalue  0.0000  0.000  0.000 
 
Akabayashi and Psacharopoulos (1999) have talked about an observed trade-off when a change 
in an exogenous factor increases child labor participation and decreases (at the same time) school 
participation
15.    
Concerning the observed trade-off, the results suggest that the null hypothesis of no observed trade-off 
in equation (H2) can be rejected for the entire sample: 
  In the co-choice between HHC and schooling for sex, child of the household head, number 
of household head children, urban area, female household head, polygamous household, 
head secondary and higher education. 
  In the co-choice between MO and schooling for age, sex, child of the household head, 
number  of  household  head  children,  proportion  of  girls  among  the  children  of  the 
household head, urban area, polygamous household, head secondary education. 
  In the co-choice between NMO and schooling for sex, child of the household head, number 
of household head children, proportion of girls among the children of the household head, 
urban area, female household head, polygamous household, head secondary and higher 
education. 
The main result suggests that boys (girls) have an increased (decreased) probability to go to school and a 
decreased (increased) probability to make labor activities.  
 Concerning  unobserved  trade-off  or  intrinsic  competition  between  schooling  and  NMO 
activities, MO activities, and HHC, Table 4 shows the correlation coefficient from the Quadri-variate 
Probit  estimations.  The  null  hypothesis  of  independence  between  schooling  decisions  and  labor 
participation of children ( NMO MO HHC m Sm , , ; 0   :     H 3    ) can be rejected for MO activities, NMO 
activities, and HHC for children, both boys and girls. The correlation coefficient, which is significantly 
                                                           
15 Authors have talked about an overall trade-off between working and studying when, for almost all exogenous variables, the 
signs of the marginal effects on working hours are opposite to those of the hours of study. In that sense, no variable is found to 
increase both working and studying significantly at the same time. 19 
 
negative (at 1%) in all the estimations, implies that the decisions of schooling and labor are made in an 
interdependent way and can be analyzed as co-choices. School attendance decreases as a result of an 
increase in labor participation due to unobserved factors. The reason that the child does not go to 
school is not independent of his labor contribution at home. According to previous papers, a higher 
value for ρ is equivalent to a stronger trade-off between the two decisions’ interests.  
Table 4. Coefficient of unobserved trade-off among school and labor 
Co-choice schooling-  Sample   ρ  z 
HHC   Children   -0,304  -9.05 
Boys   -0,269  -6.21 
Girls   -0,324  -6.76 
MO activities 
 
Children   -0,535  -21.08 
Boys   -0,496  -12.9 
Girls   -0,577  -15.8 
NMO activities  Children   -0,206  -6.29 
Boys   -0,216  -5.05 
Girls   -0,198  -4.14 
 
For all children, boys and girls, the trade-off coefficients reveal a stronger competition for co-
choice  between  MO  activities  and  schooling,  following  the  co-choice  between  HHC  activities  and 
schooling,  and  then  the  co-choice  between  NMO  activities  and  schooling.  We  can  say  that  NMO 
activities  are  less  constraining  (restrictive)  than  HHC,  which  are  in  turn  less  constraining  than  MO 
activities. Muniz (2001) found that trade-off between work and study is much larger in waged tasks than 
in non-waged.
16  
Although this is not the object of this study, the results also suggest a correlation between the 
different labor activities: the correlation coefficients between HHC and MO, MO and NMO, and HHC and 
NMO are significant but positive. The null hypothesis of independence between labor activities can be 
rejected. This result suggests that a labor contribution increases as the result of an increase of another 
labor contribution due to unobserved factors. 
Finally, concerning gender bias (Table 5), the results reveal differences among determinants of 
activities. Consistent with descriptive statistics, age is an increasing component of HHC participation for 
girls,  whereas  for boys, participation increases and then decreases with age , the rate of decrease 
becoming  less  with  age .  For  MO  activities,  boys’  participation  increases  with  age;  for  girls,  the 
participation decreases and then increases with age, the rate of increase becoming less with age. For 
                                                           
16  The correlation coefficient is difficult to interpret since the value also depends on the omitted variable. So I refer only to the 
interpretation that the reason why the child does not go to school is not independent of his labor contribution at home. 
 20 
 
schooling, boys’ participation decreases with age, while for girls, the participation increases and then 
decreases with age. 
The results suggest that only the girls of the household head have a decreasing probability of 
working (NMO, MO, HHC), and the component is not significant for boys. In the same way, living in an 
urban area is a decreasing component for HHC, through the component is not significant for boys’ 
contribution to HHC. A female household head is an increasing component for boys’ participation in MO 
activities, while the component is not significant for girls.  Girls in polygamous households have a higher 
probability of engaging in MO activities, but the component is not significant for boys.   Empirical studies 
have generally shown the significant impact of gender composition of siblings on the education of girls 
and boys (see Barnet-Verzat & Wolff , 2003, for a review of literature). For example, Butcher and Case 
(1994) noted that for women with a large number of brothers, the level of education is more important 
than for others. The quantity-quality model (Becker and Lewis , 1973; Becker and Tomes , 1976, 1986; 
Becker , 1991) suggests that children (girls and boys) with sisters are in a better situation than children 
with brothers. Garg and Morduch  (1998) and Morduch (2000) confirmed these predictions for Tanzania 
and Ghana. The results for EPAM Mali do not necessarily confirm these predictions. The proportion of 
girls among the head of household’s children is an increasing component only for boys’ participation at 
school. The results also confirm a difference concerning head education and head income. Finally, the 
results suggest that the presence of the domestic in a household and the number of females more than 
12 years old are decreasing components of HHC and NMO participation, respectively. This latter result 
confirms the gender difference in the repartition of time and tasks.  22 
 
Table 5 Quadri-variate Probit for co-choice between HHC, MO, NMO and schooling: Sub-sample of boys and girls. 
 
Boys (n=1533)  Girls (n=1474) 
Variables   HHC  MO  NMO   Schc  HHC  MO  NMO   Schc 
  Coef  Z  Coef  Z  Coef  Z  Coef  Z  Coef  Z  Coef  Z  Coef  Z  Coef  Z 
Age  2,419  1.73*  0,120  8.35
$  0,025  1.93**  0,195  1.30  0,117  7.47
$  -4,99  -3.14
$  0,035  2.34**  3,206  1.95** 
Age
2/100  -17,86  -1.75*          -1,038  -1.94**      37,23  3.23
$      -24,563  -2.05** 
Age
3/1000  438,7  1.80*                  -884,1  -3.23
$      588,22  2.06** 
Child of HH head  -0,068  -0.69  0,083  0.78  0,117  1.19  0,243  2.39**  -0,532  -4.84
$  -0,28  -2.87
$  -0,296  -2.83
$  1,065  9.79
$ 
Number of head’s children  -0,031  -2.20**  -0,031  -2.12**  -0,006  -0.45  -0,002  -0.11  -0,012  -0.80  -0,039  -2.74
$  0,003  0.17  -0,005  -0.33 
Proportion of girls  0,106  0.75  -0,138  -0.96  -0,008  -0.06  0,523  3.50
$  0,197  1.40  0,107  0.88  -0,045  -0.36  -0,063  -0.46 
Urban   -0,066  -0.81  -0,769  -7.88
$  -0,534  -6.75
$  0,898  10.3
$  -0,390  -4.34
$  -0,617  -6.52
$  -0,857  -10.27
$  0,785  8.85
$ 
Female HH head  -0,035  -0.28  0,255  1.97**  0,000  -0.00  0,247  1.91**  -0,191  -1.38  0,177  1.25  -0,061  -0.45  0,359  2.48
$ 
Polygamous HH  0,017  0.21  0,128  1.57  0,048  0.63  -0,023  -0.29  0,040  0.47  0,135  1.61*  -0,001  -0.01  -0,062  -0.71 
Head, primary education  0,234  1.73*  0,133  0.97  0,202  1.56  0,558  3.81
$  0,235  1.46  0,303  2.05**  -0,001  -0.01  -0,061  -0.38 
Head, secondary education  -0,283  -2.93
$  -0,030  -0.30  -0,354  -3.85
$  0,608  5.93
$  -0,005  -0.05  -0,097  -0.97  -0,306  -3.30
$  0,480  4.80
$ 
Head, higher education  -0,234  -1.23  -0,745  -2.52**  -0,812  -3.59
$  1,047  4.04
$  -0,397  -2.30**  0,465  2.60
$  -1,058  -5.05
$  0,286  1.54 
Head income of  1
rst labor  0,002  0.09  0,004  0.18  -0,009  -0.51  0,024  1.24  -0,002  -0.10  0,025  1.30  0,018  0.96  -0,005  -0.24 
Head income of 2
nd labor  0,078  2.62
$  0,061  1.93**  0,054  1.82*  0,030  0.99  -0,024  -0.69  0,073  2.05**  -0,032  -0.90  0,061  1.68* 
Head farmer      0,457  5.55
$  0,014            0,355  4.35
$         
Number of Females (> 12 
years of age) 
        -0,305  0.39              -0,092  -3.13
$     
Domestic in the HH  -0,490  -0.81              -0,601  -3.33
$             
Constant   -11,26  -1.79*  -2,027  -8.16
$  0,117  -1.40  -1,243  -1.21  -0,352  -1.39  21,016  2.93
$  0,561  2.24**  -14,210  -1.93** 
RhoMO_HHC  0,254  5.79
$              0,402  8.21
$             
RhoNMO_HHC  0,646  21.2
$              0,774  29.0
$             
RhoS_HHC  -0,269  -6.21
$              -0,324  -6.76
$             
RhoNMO_MO  0,358  8.79
$              0,281  6.12
$             
RhoS_MO  -0,496  -12.9
$              -0,577  -15.8
$             
RhoS_NMO  -0,216  -5.05
$              -0,198  -4.14
$             
Log pseudolikelihood  χ²=  -3331.7622   Pr =     0.0000  χ²= -2832.2   pr= 0.0000 
Wald chi2  558.91  898.51 
Likelihood ratio test of  rho21 = rho31 = rho41 = rho32 = rho42 = rho43 = 0:    χ²=   483.307Pr = 0.000  Likelihood ratio test of  rho21 = rho31 = rho41 = rho32 = rho42 = rho43 = 0:  χ²=  587.495 Pr = 0.00 
Note: $ significant at 1%level, ** significant at 5%level, * significant at 10% level 23 
 
5. CLOGIT ESTIMATION FOR THE REGRESSION OF SCHOOL PARTICIPATION 
UNDER TIME SPENT IN LABOR ACTIVITIES 
a. PRESENTATION  
The aim of this section is to examine how the repartition of time between children within the 
household affects the participation at school of a given child. Let’s suppose that: 
i i i i i i NMO T MO T HHC T X school           4 3 2 1
* _ _ _    
 
  (3) 
where  T_HHCi,  T_MOi,  T_NMOi  represent  time  devoted  respectively  to  HHC,  MO,  NMO,  and  Xi 
observable characteristics, and i is the index of the child. Equation (3) cannot be estimated consistently 
while omitting unobserved individual (for example, ability and parents’ preferences) and household 
specific  effects  from  the  regression.  Therefore,  I  controlled  for  individual-specific  unobserved 
heterogeneity using Chamberlain’s fixed effects Logit model (Chamberlain , 1980). The model enables 
control for family specific effects and gives an effective representation of the family background. The 
model is attractive because it avoids the correction by instrumental variables methods, especially since 
in practice it can be difficult to obtain a valid instrument.   
I transformed the data in the panel by defining schoolif (T_HHCif, T_MOif, T_NMOif) for the school 
participation (respectively, time devoted to HHC, MO, NMO) of child i in the family f. By assuming that 
the unobserved household specific effect is constant across siblings, the unobserved household specific 
effects are eliminated. In the likelihood function, explanatory variables that do not vary within the unit 
cancel out. Also, the algorithm eliminated households in which all the children are enrolled or all the 
children are not enrolled. The fixed effect Logit estimator of βk gives the effect of each explanatory 
variable on the log-odds ratio. The independent variables defined for the analysis are as follows: age, 
child of the household head, class for hours in activities (less than 7 hours a week, between 7 and 14 
hours a week, more than 14 hours a week), and interaction terms for girls’ time in labor activities.  
b. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
Table 6 presents the results of the Clogit estimation of participation at school. The results suggest 
that  hours  in  MO  activities  have  a  significant  and  negative  impact  on  the  probability  of  school 




Table 6. Clogit estimation for participation at school  
Similarly, hours in NMO activities have 
a  significant  and  negative  impact  on 
the probability of school participation 
when  children  provide  more  than  14 
hours per week, or 2 hours a day. The 
time spend in HHC has a negative, but 
not significant, effect. This result may 
be due to composition effect, given the 
gender  difference  observed  in  the 
descriptive  analysis.  Regarding  the 
interaction  terms,  the  results  suggest 
that  girls  have  a  lower  probability  of 
going to school when they provide at 
least 7 hours of HHC per week and 14 
hours of MO activities per week. These 
results  confirm  that  contribution  to 
HHC  is  restrictive  for  girls’  education, 
the same as involvement in the labor 
market.  Kruger  and  Berthelot  (2007) 
also noted in Brazil that any amount of 
time dedicated to domestic work is a 
deterrent  to  girls’  human  capital 
accumulation  and  that  this  harmful 
effect  is  greater  the  more  time  that 
they spend on household duties. Their 
findings  revealed  that  even  a  small 
amount of time dedicated to domestic chores may be enough to cause young Brazilian girls to drop out 
of school. 
   
   Coef.  z 
age  -0,239  -5.90
$ 
Enfant du chef   1,435  4.45
$ 
Hours in NMO [7 -14 [  -0,226  -0.56 
Hours in HHC [7 -14 [  -0,102  -0.13 
Hours in  MO [7 -14 [  -2,212  -2.81
$ 
Hours in NMO >14    -1,152  -1.79
$ 
Hours in HHC >14    -0,451  -0.92 
Hours in  MO >14    -1,413  -4.03
$ 
Interaction  
Girl * Hours in NMO [7 -14 [  -0,318  -0.48 
Girl * Hours in HHC [7 -14 [  -1,366  -1.73* 
Girl * Hours in  MO [7 -14 [  -0,128  -0.12 
Girl * Hours in NMO >14    0,674  0.72 
Girl * Hours in HHC >14    -1,140  -2.09** 
Girl * Hours in  MO >14    -0,954  -2.05** 
Observations  1040 
Wald chi2  125.90 pr 0.000 
Log pseudolikelihood = -236.35547 
Pseudo R2 = 0.3854 
Note $ significant at 1% level, **5% level, * 10%level 
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6.   CONCLUSION  
 
This paper uses the UCW project definition of child labor and EPAM Mali 2007 to analyze the 
gender difference in the co-choice between child labor and schooling. A Quadri-variate estimation is 
used to highlight the interdependence and the trade-off between school and child labor, and a Clogit 
regression is used to show how the repartition of time among children within the household affects 
participation at school. The differences observed in the determinants of labor suggest that it is more 
interesting and informative to consider MO activities, NMO activities and HHC separately.  The results 
first give evidence of an observed trade-off, which is the case if the independent variables’ effect on a 
child’s labor force participation is opposite to their effect on school participation. In the same way, there 
is  an  intrinsic  competition  (or  unobserved  trade-off)  between  schooling  and  HHC,  MO,  and  NMO 
activities.  The competition between school and HHC, MO, and NMO activities reveals that the reason 
why children do not go to school is not independent of the repartition of time and labor at home. 
Concerning gender differences, girl-children (boy-children) have a lower (higher) probability of going to 
school and a higher (lower) probability of working. Better yet, girls have a higher probability to do HHC. 
They devote a mean of 22 hours per week of HHC (vs. half that time for boys); and the time spent in this 
activity increases with age for girls, whereas the time devoted decreases with age for boys.  
The repartition of time and tasks among children is segregated by gender and time in HHC, a 
type of labor that has been invisible to analysts and economists and generally neglected in the literature 
of child-labor, and it is harmful for girls’ schooling.  
This analysis also confirms the differential gender socialization of children. Boys in the sample 
were more engaged in productive and economic activities, while girls were more engaged in HHC. 
Almost half of the boys did exclusively productive and economic activities while the proportion was two 
times  lower  for  girls.  Conversely,  almost  half  the  girls  in  the  sample  engaged  in  exclusively  “non-
economic” but productive activities, while the proportion was four times lower for boys. It seems that 
parents encourage the gender division of tasks as girls and boys are engaged in different labors.  Girls 
are generally prepared for their role in their own future homes.  These results reveal the difficulties for 
policy  makers  since  child-labor,  at  least  in  part,  refers  to  child-socialization.  Promoting  women’s 
employment and wages in the labor market could be a way to promote girls’ schooling.  
 
This analysis can be extended by considering the bargaining process between school decisions 
and labor—in which fathers and mothers decide on the allocation of time (labor market or/and to 
school) among children—and by exploring the possibility of an extra household gender bias in this 
decision. For this, the information on the EPAM survey may be completed by providing information on 
women’s  empowerment  and  information  that  allows  the  researcher  to  match  children  with  their 
mothers.   26 
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